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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ERROR IN CHARGING A MISDEMEANOR
AS A FELONY
Whittington v. State'
The defendant-appellant was tried on an indictment
which charged that he "did then and there feloniously steal
and take away forty pounds of tobacco" of the value of ten
dollars. The trial court overruled a demurrer to the indict-
ment which was based on the ground that it was improper
to charge that the act was "feloniously" committed. On
defendant's appeal from a conviction, Held: Reversed. The
larceny of goods under the value of $25 is a misdemeanor'
and an indictment which charges the commission of a mis-
demeanor as felonious is invalid.
The case presents two points for consideration: The
distinction in Maryland between felonies and misdemean-
ors; and the fatal effect of placing the word "feloniously"
in a misdemeanor indictment.
At early common law the distinction between felony and
misdemeanor was almost impossible of definition. "Neither
of the words, felony or misdemeanor, of themselves have
any exactness or precision of definition. At common law
felony was an offence which occasioned a total forfeiture
of land or goods or both, and a misdemeanor was an offence
less than a felony." 3 The status of the felony has, today,
become more complex, and its general definition in this
country may be stated to be: A felony is an offence which
by the statutes or by the common law is punishable with
death alone, or to which the old English law attached the
total forfeiture of lands or goods or both, or which a statute
expressly declares to be such." As, in this country, there
is no forfeiture of property upon conviction of crime, that
means of determining what is a felony is extinct. Never-
theless, it is a recognized fact that the general law of this
country will include within the definition of "felony" all
the common law felonies.5 Since the outmoding of for-
feiture and since many states have, by statute, declared new
crimes to be felonies, it is now more accurate to say that a
felony is any crime which was one at common law, which
' 196 Atl. 314 (Md. 1938).
2 Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Sec. 319.
' State v. Biggs, 52 Ore. 433, 435, 97 Pac. 713 (1908).
4 1 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th Ed.) Sec. 615.
5 Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 378, 91 At. 417 (1914). Clark and Mar-
shall, Crimes, Sec. 3.
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has been declared one by statute, or which is punishable by
death alone.6
At this point it is convenient to inquire why there should
be any distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. It
must be admitted that crimes should be classified according
to the gravity of the anti-social conduct, for it is desirable
to deal more strictly with those persons who have committed
the greater crimes than with those who have committed
lesser ones. For example, there is no need for arraignment
in misdemeanor cases.' Lesser crimes may be tried beforejustices of the peace more freely than more serious ones.'
In Maryland, evidence illegally obtained is not admissible in
misdemeanor cases.9 It is easier to make a lawful arrest
for a felony. There may be misprision of felony but not of
misdemeanor. 0 In Maryland it is criminal to solicit a
felony but not to solicit a misdemeanor.loa
Many jurisdictions have recognized the difficulty in lim-
iting felonies to the common law felonies," and "in most,
if not all of the United States, the word felony has either by
statute or judicial construction acquired the meaning of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in a state
prison. ,12 Very often it is provided that one convicted of
a crime punishable by a sentence of one year must be placed
in the penitentiary." Since the only purpose in dividing
crimes is to segregate them into the greater and the lesser,
the best possible method would seem to be a separation on
the basis of the punishment for the crime, for the greater
the crime, the more severe the punishment. We see, there-
fore, that the great majority of the states use a practicable
method, and one that still meets the definition of a felony
by including the common law felonies which are, still, the
more serious crimes.
Bishop, op. cit. supra note 4, See. 615 (3). There Is, today, no crime In
Maryland punishable only by death.
7 Salfner v. State, 84 Md. 299, 35 Atl. 885 (1896) ; Dutton v. State, aupra,
note 5.
Crawford v. State. 197 At. 866 (Md. 1938).
Id. Code Snpp., Art. 35. See. 4-A.
21 Marbury v. Brooks, 7 Wheat. 556. 5 L. Ed. 522 (1822).
" a Lamb v. State. 67 Md. 524, 10 Atl. 208, 298 (1887) ; Bittle v. State, 78
Md. 526, 28 Atl. 405 (lS94).
"1 The common law felonies were: Murder, manslaughter, arson,
burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny (both grand and
petit). The statute cited supra note 2 made petit larceny only a misde-
meanor and raised the distinguishing sum from five dollars to twenty-five
dollars. Prior to that Maryland had the common law rule that petit lar-
ceny was also a felony.
is 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, (12th Ed.) Sec. 26, n. 16. See also Benton
v. Comm., 89 Va. 570, 16 S. E. 725 (1893) ; People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29,
32 N. E. 1105 (1893).
" People v. Hughes, supra note 12.
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In Maryland we have no such method of distinction but,
on the contrary, limit our felonies to the common law fel-
onies and those made so by statute, while a misdemeanor is
any crime other than a felony. 4  Our Court has said :
"The distinction made in some jurisdictions that
crimes punishable by death or confinement in the peni-
tentiary are felonies, and others misdemeanors, has
never existed in this State, but here only those are fel-
onies which were such at common law, or have been so
declared by statute. The fact that a crime is punish-
able in the penitentiary or is infamons does not make
it a felony in this State."
The result of this obsolete method of ascertaining what
is a felony has been the absurd proposition that some of the
most heinous crimes in the state are misdemeanors. For
examples: assault to rob, murder, or have carnal knowledge
are misdemeanors. Assault with intent to rape is one also,
although it carries a possible death sentence.'" As pointed
out by Wharton in his work on Criminal Law:"7 "It is im-
possible not to be amazed at a system which made perjury
a misdemeanor and larceny a felony; which while making
it a felony to steal five shillings, made it only a misdemeanor
to conspire to rob a bank."
It would seem that in the light of the difficulties caused
in Maryland by the common law definition of a felony, it
would be desirable to have a statute drawing a definite line
between a felony and a misdemeanor, one that really sepa-
rates the higher and more serious from the lesser crimes.
In the opinion of many authorities, this should be done on
the basis of the possible length of imprisonment or the pos-
sibility of incarceration in a State penitentiary or to receive
the death penalty."8
In the principal case the Court decided that to place the
word "feloniously" in a misdemeanor indictment was fatal
error. The overwhelming weight of authority is against
this view, although it was the common law rule, still fol-
lowed in England, Vermont and, possibly, Massachusetts.
Outside these jurisdictions the courts generally hold that it
14 State v. Phelps, 9 Md. 21 (1856).
15 Dutton v. State, supra note 5, 123 Md. 373, 378. See also aupra note 11.
21 Ibid, Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Sec. 17.
III Wharton, Criminal Law, (12th Ed.), Sec. 26.
is For a discussion of the common law distinctions under the Bouse Act,
see Note (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 147, 155 et seq.
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is mere surplusage to include the word "feloniously" in a
misdemeanor indictment. 9
The Court, in the principal case, relied on the decision in
Black v. State.20 The two cases lay down the same proposi-
tion, that to allege that one did "feloniously" commit an act
which is a misdemeanor is to convict him of felony if he be
found guilty. The Court said in the Black case :20a "The
prisoner has been convicted of an infamous crime, to-wit, a
felony, when the offense proved against him according to
legal definition was not of that character."
In the Black case the Court relied heavily on Common-
wealth v. Newell,2' a Massachusetts case of 1810. The Black
case was decided in 1852 and failed to mention the later
Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Squire,22 decided
in 1840, which reached a contrary result and held that the
word could be treated as surplusage.2'
Although the Black case2" rejects an Ohio case25 also
holding that the word amounted to mere surplusage, and
said of it: "We cannot adopt that decision, unsupported
by a single authority" and although at that time the Ohio
court was advancing a new principle of law, today the great
weight of case and secondary authority supports a rule con-
trary to the Maryland law on the point.26 Upon reflection,
and in the light of the holdings adverse to our Maryland
cases, it does cause one to wonder why there should be such
magic property in so modest an adverb as "feloniously" as
to give it the power of transforming into a felony a well de-
scribed act already defined as a misdemeanor. The result
of the Maryland decisions, as in the principal case, is to
make it necessary for the prosecution to go to the time,
trouble, and expense of re-indictment and new prosecution.
19 Conversely, however, it is usually held error to omit the word from
a felony indictment.
102 Md. 376 (1852).
"0a Ibid, 2 Md. 376, 380.
"7 Mass. 245 (1810).
1 Mete. 258 (Mass. 1840).
2" See also Comm. v. Philpot, 130 Mass. 59 (1880). It might be pointed
out that statutes in Massachusetts may vary the rule from time to time.
"S Supra, note 20
35 Hess v. State, 5 Oh. 5, 22 Am. Dec. 767 (1831).
20 State v. Parks, 78 Ind. 166 (1881) ; Comm. v. Philpot, supra, note 23;
Comm. v. Squire, supra, note 22; State v. Connerry, 17 Minn 72 (1871);
State v. Hogard, 12 Minn. 293 (1866) ; State v. Jones, 19 Mo. 224 (1855);
State v. Edwards, 90 N. C. 711 (1884); Stager v. Comm., 103 Pa. 469(1883); Hess v. State, esupra, note 25; State v. Howes, 26 W. Va. 110(1885); State v. Satterfield, 29 Del. 443, 100 Atl. 473 (1917) ; Hoagland,
et al., v. U. S., 28 Fed. (2nd) 871 (1928). See also 1 Bishop, Criminal
Law (8th Ed.), Sec. 810; Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, Sees.
26, 742; Hochheimer, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Se. 103.
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Advanced legal minds, recognizing the need for swift
and certain conviction of criminals and realizing that some
of our procedural, as well as substantive, law has become so
obsolete as to be a clog on the wheels of justice, recommend
the abolition of technicalities which prevent the punishment
of wrongdoers. As so well expressed by the Pennsylvania
court: "Mere technical matters which do not affect the
merits receive much less consideration than they did a cen-
tury ago."' '
There is need for statutory reform, both of the distinc-
tion between felony and misdemeanor, and concerning the
fatal effect on indictments of such insignificant errors.
LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR TORT OF CHILD
Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips et al.'
Kerrigan v. Carroll et al.2
In the first principal case the trial court held demurrable
the declaration of the plaintiff administratrix, who sought
to recover for the pain and suffering of her decedent caused
by the tort of the child of the defendants in the negligent
driving of an automobile which resulted in the death both of
the plaintiff's decedent and of the defendants' said child.
On appeal, Held: Reversed and new trial awarded. The
declaration alleged that the said defendants permitted and
failed to prohibit the operation of the automobile by the said
child when they knew or should have known that he was
negligent, reckless, and incompetent in the operation of
automobiles. The Court said that this was sufficient, if
proven, to create liability on the part of the parents for
their primary negligence, regardless of any theory of im-
puted negligence, or actual agency, or of the "family car
doctrine", the rejection of which, in Maryland, the Court
reasserted. The Court held that an automobile is a poten-
tially dangerous, rather than an inherently dangerous in-
strumentality. The Court relied on the Restatement of the
Law of Torts8 to reach the end of liability. It was held im-
material, as to the father, that the title to the automobile
was in the name of the mother, because the father had the
power to prohibit the child's use of the automobile.
27 Staeger v. Comm., 8upra, note 26.
1 166 Md. 151, 178 AtM 532 (1934).
'168 Md. 682, 179 AtM 53 (1935).
s Restatement, Torts, Sec. 390 (was Sec. 260 when cited by the Court).
